janKipo wrote:
sewi are a distinct sort of thing from jan. this is objectionable anthropomorphism. But, taking it as metaphorical OK.
I'm not sure how you interpret that, but strictly it is just part of the definition, and means; God is a person of complete goodness. It is not metaphorical or an anthropomorphism. I really didn't strictly need the "jan", the "jan" is implied with "sewi"
janKipo wrote:
jan li pilin e toki nanpa tu wan la ona li wile pilin e ni: sewi li lon. If this is a premise to an argument that God exists, the argument is circular. Or rather, it can conclude only that, *according to this argument* God exists, but says nothing about what is really the case. Note, incidentally, that radiating goodness to all worlds doesn't require being in all worlds
I'm not sure what your toki pona sentence there is trying to mean; that someone who feels premise 3 should feel that God exists ? What does that even mean ? What you quoted that I actually wrote were not premises, they are still part of the definition; aka "in this argument" fragment before "la".
Note, incidentally, that the different worlds in modal logic are not accessible from each other in any way, so for an entity to do anything in one, means said entity must exist in that world.
janKipo wrote:
Since God's existence is something claimed in an argument and is not obviously contradictry or paradoxical, I suppose we can allow this outside the argument.
That is not outside the argument, it is actually premise number one. It is customary to number the premises in the argument. "nanpa wan: ... " should make it obvious this is actually the first premise in the argument. The only one actually that is important, since if you accept that, you have to accept the conclusion; God exists.
janKipo wrote:
Not sure why 'lon ken' rather than 'ken lon' but it doesn't seem to matter.
It is the difference between possibly existing, and existing possibly. So im not saying he might exist in a world, Im saying he definitely exists in atleast one world out of all the possible ones.
janKipo wrote:
Whoa, Nellie! you can't jump the whole ontological argument in one sentence. This is the crux of the argument and so needs to be laid out in detail. As it stands, it is almost certainly false (it is for everything else).
This step is trivial, and comes from how God is defined, if he definitely exists in one possible world, then he exists in all of them.
This is true by definition, so it is not actually coherent to claim it is false.
janKipo wrote:
So, circular and unsound at least,
It is not circular, as you demonstrated, since you found it easy to accept premise 1, and then was amazed with the knew knowledge that that means you should believe God actually exists.
It is not unsound, since it is logically valid, and as you agree the only input premise, 1, is acceptably true.
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Clearly though you do not want to believe in God, so you probably want to just say that you do not believe premise 1, and you think God as so defined is not even possible.
--- I am sure we went over all of this before... :/
Follower of the official dialect of toki pona as presented in the official book; Toki Pona, The Language of Good by Sonja Lang.